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230 GREEN v. GoRDON' [39 C.2d 
that no such authority existed; that the refund order was 
void as being without the jurisdiction of the court; and that 
prohibition should issue to halt the contempt proceeding 
based thereon. Likewise in the present case, we find in the 
provisions of the Inheritance Tax Law no authority or right 
for the assessment of the further tax sought by the Controller. 
[7] There is, therefore, no occasion for the application here 
of the general legal principle, relied upon by the Controller, 
that "a statute may not be construed as creating a right 
without a remedy." (See Bermite Powder Co. v. Franchise 
Tax Board (1952), 38 Cal.2d 700, 703 [242 P.2d 9].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
7, 1952. 
[S. F. No. 18523. In Bank. July 9, 1952.] 
JOHN D. GREEN, Appellant, v. WALTER A. GORDON 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Motions-Orders to Show Cause.-An order to show cause is 
in the nature of a citation to a party to appear at a stated 
time and place to show why the requested relief should not 
be granted. 
[2] Mandamus-DismissaL-A showing on general demurrer that 
a petition for writ of mandate does not state sufficient facts 
to justify relief is a complete answer to an order to show 
cause, and the court is then warranted in discharging the 
order and dismissing the proceeding. 
[3] Pardon-Commutation of Sentence-Conditional Commutation. 
-While in some types of cases the terms of a commutation 
of sentence might be more objectionable to the prisoner than 
the punishment fixed by his sentence, and a commutation 
may not be imposed on him without his consent, if he ac-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Motions and Orders, § 3; Am.Jur., Motions, 
Rules and Orders, § 38. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Pardon, § 3; Am.Jur., Pardon, Reprieve and 
Amnesty, § 63. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Motions, § 6; [2] Mandamus, § 101; 
[3-5] Pardon, § 4. 
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cepts the commutation he must take it subject to the speci-
fied conditions. 
[ 4] !d.-Commutation of Sentence--Conditional Commutation.-
Withholding of parole on commutation of a death sentence 
to life imprisonment is a reasonable condition. 
[5] !d.--Commutation of Sentence-Conditional Commutation.-
Statutory provisions relating to penalties for murder and the 
right to parole do not purport to limit the governor's power 
to impose conditions on a commutation of sentence, and they 
do not prevent him from commuting a death sentence to life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. Jordan L. Martinelli, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel Adult Authority to 
consider petitioner's application for parole. Judgment of 
dismissal affirmed. 
Elizabeth Cassidy for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and David K. Lener, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-In 1932, petitioner was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death. After affirmance of the conviction 
(People v. Green, 217 Cal. 176 [17 P.2d 730]), Governor 
Rolph commuted the sentence to "life imprisonment with-
out parole.'' Because of the terms of the commutation, the 
Adult Authority has refused to entertain petitioner's ap-
plication for parole. 
The superior court issued an order to show cause why 
mandate should not be granted to compel the Adult Authority 
to consider petitioner's application.* The return consisted of 
a general demurrer to the petition, and at the hearing thereon 
the court rendered a judgment of dismissal, from which 
petitioner has appealed. 
He contends that by issuing the order to show cause the 
trial court passed upon the sufficiency of the petition and 
*Although habeas corpus may be used to test the validity of the 
terms of a commutation (In r·e Collie, 38 Cal.2d 396, 397-398 [240 
P.2d 2751, a petitioner may also use mandate to compel the Adult 
Authority to entertain an application for parole if it has wrongfully 
refused to pass on the application. (C/. Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 
351, 355 [196 P.2d 562] ; Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 
23 Cal.2d 303, 315 [144 P.2d 4].) 
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thereafter had no power to dispose of the matter without 
making express findings on the issues presented. [1] An 
order to show cause is in the nature of a citation to a party 
to appear at a stated time and place to show why the re-
quested relief should not be granted. (See Difani v. River-
side County Oil Co., 201 Cal. 210, 213-214 [256 P. 210] .) 
[2] Obviously, a showing on general demurrer that the pe-
tition does not state sufficient facts to justify relief is a 
complete answer to an order to show cause, and the court 
is then warranted in discharging the order and dismissing 
the proceeding. 
We recently held that a commutation of sentence is in 
the nature of a favor which, under article VII, section 1, 
of the Constitution, may be withheld entirely or granted 
upon such reasonable conditions, restrictions and limita-
tions as the governor may think proper, that the general 
statutory regulations relating to parole (Pen. Code. § 3040 
et seq.) did not amount to an attempt to interfere with the 
governor's power, and that the withholding of parole upon 
the commutation of a death sentence to life imprisonment 
was not unreasonable. (In re Collie, 38 Oal.2d 396, 398-399 
[240 P.2d 275] .) [3] It is, of course, a possibility that in 
some types of cases the terms of a commutation may be more 
objectionable to the prisoner than the punishment fixed by 
his sentence, and a commutation may not be imposed on 
him without his consent. ( Cf. In re Peterson, 14 Cal.2d 82, 
84-85 [92 P.2d 890].) If he accepts the commutation, 
however, he must take it subject to the specified conditions. 
[4] Thereafter the validity of the conditions depends on 
their reasonableness and the condition imposed here must be 
held to be a reasonable one. (See In re Collie, supra.) 
[5] Petitioner concedes that the Legislature cannot in-
terfere with the governor's power to commute a sentence 
of death, but he claims that the T_;egislature has exclusive 
control over penalties for crimes, and that the punishment 
which has been provided for first degree murder is either 
death or life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. 
He argues that the governor cannot impose a different punish-
ment, i.e., imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole. The penalties prescribed by statute, however, are 
the ones to be imposed by the trial court upon conviction 
of murder, and the statutory provisions relating to such 
penalties and the right to parole do not purport to limit 
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the governor's power to impose conditions upon a commuta-
tion of sentence. (See Pen. Code, §§ 190, 3040 et seq.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
While the holding of the majority of this court in this 
case is in accord with In re Collie, 38 Cal.2d 396 [240 P.2d 
275], I have concluded that the last mentioned case was errone-
ously decided and should therefore be overruled. In my 
opinion the legal principle here involved is comparatively 
simple. Article VII, section 1 of the Constitution of California 
was adopted in 1879. At that time there was no parole law 
in this state, the first parole law having been enacted in 
1893 (Stats. 1893, p. 183). It is therefore obvious that when 
article VII, section 1, was adopted it was not contemplated 
that the governor would have power to impose as a condition 
of commutation of sentence that the prisoner whose sentence 
was commuted should not be eligible to parole. 
Section 7 of article X of the Constitution was adopted 
in 1936, and in 1940 was amended to read as follows: "Not-
withstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Consti-
tution, the Legislature may provide for the establishment, 
government, charge and superintendence of all institutions 
for all persons convicted of felonies . . . 
''All existing statutes and constitutional provisions, pur-
porting to create such institutions or such agencies or offi-
cers or boards, to so delegate such government, charge and 
superintendence, to so prescribe such powers, duties, or func-
tions, or to so provide for such punishment, treatment or 
supervision are hereby ratified, validated and declared to 
be legally effective until the Legislature provides other-
wise.'' 
It is under the latter provision of the Constitution which 
was amended in 1940 that the Legislature has power to pro-
vide for the parole of prisoners. The Legislature has pro-
vided for a uniform system of parole (see Pen. Code, §§ 3040 
et seq.) and a person sentenced to a life term in the peni-
tentiary is eligible to parole after seven years confinement 
in prison (see Pen. Code, § 3046). The power of the Legis-
lature to adopt such provision is conferred by section 7 of 
article X of the Constitution "notwithstanding anything 
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contained elsewhere in this Constitution'' which would in-
clude anything contained in section 1 of article VII of the 
Constitution, adopted long prior to section 7 of article X 
of the Constitution and the parole law. 
I think it is clear, therefore, that when section 7 of article 
X was framed, it was contemplated that the Legislature 
should have power to provide for a parole system which would 
apply to all persons convicted of felonies, and that the Gov-
ernor should not have power to nullify the parole law by 
imposing as a condition of commutation of sentence that a 
prisoner should not be eligible for parole. It seems clear 
to me that if the governor has the power to impose such a 
condition when commuting a death sentence to life imprison-
ment, he may likewise impose such a condition when com-
muting a life or other lesser sentence to a lesser term of 
years. ]'or instance, the governor could commute a life sen-
tence to 50 years without possibility of parole for 25 years 
or any other period and thus deprive a prisoner of his right 
to apply for parole until he had served such time instead 
of only seven years as provided by statute. Under such a 
rule a governor could destroy the uniform operation of any 
system of parole, at least in its application to life termers. 
While I think it is clear that it was not the intention of 
the framers of section 7 of article X of the Constitution to 
interfere with the governor's power under section 1 of arti-
cle VII of the Constitution ''to grant reprieves, pardons, and 
commutations of sentence, after conviction, for all offenses 
except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such condi-
tions, and with such restrictions and limitations, as he may 
think proper," I do not think that it was contemplated that 
the governor could impose conditions, restrictions or limita-
tions contrary to express statutory provisions which were 
enacted by the Legislature pursuant to a subsequent consti-
tutional grant of power to the Legislature. Punishment for 
crime should be fixed by legislative act and not executive fiat. 
It also appears to me that to so construe our constitutional 
and statutory provisions is to make it possible for the gov-
ernor to create a situation where a prisoner such as petitioner 
here is denied equal protection of the law in violation of the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
